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reviews the rescue efforts, three bailout packages (‘memoranda’), the ‘PSI’ of 2012 
and all; it provides a chronology of the crisis; and offers perspectives on the current 
state of affairs and future prospects. Finally, it outlines the contributions of the rest of 
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highlight, among much else, the key themes of the crisis that are also reflected on the 
volume’s title: debt, austerity and unemployment.  
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1. Introduction  
 
After brewing for some months, the Greek sovereign debt crisis finally erupted fully 
in May 2010. Seven years later, at the time of writing (Spring 2017), the process that 
was set in train in 2010 is not yet over. With GDP in real terms down about 25% from 
pre-crisis levels, living standards having dipped further still due to the high taxation, 
unemployment close to the 25% and youth unemployment nearly 60%, poverty and 
inequality rising, and debt persisting at 180% of GDP despite an unprecedented fiscal 
consolidation, this crisis will not be a mere footnote in the country’s tumultuous 
recent history. Apart from its own narrative, the Greek crisis and bailout process are 
intertwined with the global financial crisis of 2007-9 (to which some say it is a 
successor), the structure of the Eurozone (the architectural weaknesses of which may 
be linked to the crisis) and the behaviour of other countries in the Eurozone’s southern 
flank (which underwent crisis of a different order of magnitude but of a broadly 
similar nature). Thus, an examination of the Greek crisis and bailout process has the 
potential to shed light not only on the weaknesses of a peripheral Eurozone country 
and on the mechanisms put in place by the EU and Eurozone to deal with it, but also 
on the nature of the Eurozone and the pressures it places on policy-making.  
 
The book in hand aims to examine the country’s features that have played a role in the 
emergence and unfolding of the crisis as well as shedding light on the crisis itself and 
its effects. While there is a wealth of related academic literature, popular writings and 
op-ed commentary in dealing with this experience and analyzing the issues and open 
questions, as yet there are few efforts to present an integrated analysis of this 
experience. The present volume aims to fill this gap. The book and its 16 Chapters are 
broadly-based, offering political-economy, macroeconomic as well as sectoral and 
other perspectives on the country, its recent economic history, experience of the crisis 
and prospects. They are written in a way that straddles academic style and more 
popular writing and should therefore be of interest to wide audiences. 
 
This Chapter introduces the volume and provides background information to the 
Greek crisis. Reflecting the broad nature of the volume, it, too, is quite wide-ranging. 
It discusses the country’s recent macroeconomic performance, possible reasons as to 
why the country found itself in such difficulties (beyond the immediate reason that 
public finances became unsustainable), it places the Greek crisis in the context of the 
wider Eurozone architecture and its weaknesses (according to critics), and provides a 
chronology of the crisis. In this context, landmark developments are discussed such as 
the various (three to-date) ‘Memoranda’ of conditions, the PSI debt relief of 2012 as 
well as offering an overview of the different approaches to the crisis and discussing 
prospects. The Chapter concludes by briefly summarising the other contributions (15) 
to the volume. It is sub-divided into nine Sections broadly along the above themes.  
 
 
2. The Greek crisis in the context of wider Eurozone developments 
 
A consensus view of the fundamental causes of the wider Eurozone crisis, part of 
which is the Greek crisis (alongside the crises in Ireland, Portugal, Cyprus and even 
Spain) is rather elusive. Most commentators would put the blame on the structural 
problems of the Eurozone, but there are considerable differences in emphasis. Three 
different approaches would highlight the: 
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- Deep asymmetries and chronic imbalances of the type emphasised (as 
prohibitive) by the vintage ‘Optimal currency Areas’ literature: serious 
imbalances in competitiveness and savings/investments/current 
accounts/capital flows, the ensuing capital reversals and ‘sudden stops’, – 
Melitz 2016, DeGrauwe, 2015,  Baldwin and Giavazzi 2015b, asymmetric 
treatment of surplus and deficit countries Moravczik, 2012, serious 
divergences in competitiveness, Granville (2016),  deep asymmetries in nature 
and growth performances among EU countries and regions, Iversen and Hope 
(2016), Streek (2015).  
- A variant of the above view (Feld, Schmidt, Schnabel and Wieland, 2016) 
would recognise that there were indeed asymmetric capital flows but the 
pathological element was that these were used to finance excessive 
government and private consumption spending as opposed to productive 
investment spending. 
- Excessive indebtedness - lack of fiscal discipline, government debts and 
deficits. 
- Imperfection and incompleteness of the Eurozone’s institutional design and 
‘architecture’ lack of lender of last resort, no political union therefore no 
accountability of the Central Bank, no fiscal transfers, weak ECB, no banking 
union inadequate or flawed official handling and policy responses;  Wyplosz 
(Chapter 2 of this volume; Melitz (2016) 
- The 2007-9 (exogenous for the EZ) financial crisis. 
 
Naturally, these points of view, or emphasis, are not mutually incompatible.  Indeed, 
everybody would probably agree that the EZ crisis seems to have been a multi-faceted 
crisis and that all the above features have played some role; the question is what is the 
most fundamental underlying causes. While more holistic approaches (Shambaugh, 
2012; Gourinchas, Philippon and Vayanos, 2016) emphasise the multiple links 
between the various aspects, others emphasise particular aspects: Baldwin and 
Giavazzi (2015a, b), Hughes Hallett and Martinez Oliva (2015) and Lane (2012) put 
the main blame on the external imbalances and capital flows; while Wyplosz (Ch 2 
this volume) on debts/deficits and inadequate governance. 
 
Against this background, the Greek crisis erupted in early 2010, but it had been 
brewing since September 2009. In the words of Micossi (2015): 
“The Greek fiscal crisis acted as a detonator in two ways. It alerted the 
authorities and public opinions in Germany and the other ‘core’ countries to 
the possibility of large (and hidden) violations of the common fiscal rules; and 
it alerted financial markets to the risk of a sovereign default in a system where 
the provision of liquidity to ensure the orderly rollover of distressed 
sovereigns is not guaranteed”. 
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3. Summary indicators of the Greek crisis  
 
 








Notes: RGDP: Real GDP (2009=100); Unemp: Unemployment (%); Pri Budget: Government 
PRIMARY budget balance (% of GDP); Budget: Government primary budget balance (% of GDP; -
=deficit); Debt: Public debt (% of GDP); RURL: Relative Unit Labour cost; CA: Current account (% of 
GDP). Source: OECD and AMECO database of the European Commission 
 
 
Table 1 summarises the country’s experience in the years preceding and during the 
crisis. The middle columns give the state of public finances (government debt and 
deficit) that triggered the crisis from the late 2009 – early 2010. The same columns 
also show the herculean fiscal adjustment that the country has achieved in the space of 
seven or so years (unprecedented since the Great Depression of the 1930s) but also 
the root of the continuing malaise: the persistence of extremely high indebtedness 
(despite the ‘Private Sector Involvement’, the drastic private sector ‘haircut’ of 2012). 
The first two columns show the cost of the crisis for the domestic economy: A real 
GDP that registered an increase of 25% and more during the good years of the EMU 
(when markets did not notice the internal and external deficits-fuelled growth and low 
interest rates and inflation boosted credit and consumption expansion) but that it now 
about 25% less that the 2001 level; and living standards that are even lower as there 
has been and continues to be a barrage of taxes). Unemployment has soared to the 
25% mark; youth unemployment (not shown) is nearer 60%. Inequality, poverty and 
social exclusion, all have been rising drastically since 2010; though these phenomena 
cannot be captured by a few numbers, OECD data reveal that Greece’ Gini coefficient 
was around 0.3-0.35 for the latter part of the 200s, climbing to 0.34-0.345  around 
2013. At the same time, the relative poverty rate climbed from about 0.12-0.13 to 
0.15. The picture would not be complete without a look at the taxation, which (ample 
anecdotal evidence suggests) has been rising across the board. A recent report by 
OECD (2017) suggests that in Greece, the average single worker faced a net average 
tax rate of 25.4% in 2016 (OECD average: 25.5%). Taking into account child-related 
benefits and tax provisions, the equivalent tax rate for an average married worker with 
two children was 23% in 2016, which is the 5th highest in the OECD (whose average 
is 14.3%). In other words, income and social insurance contributions taxation is quite 
high if one takes into account what one can expect back in terms of welfare 
provisions, which are quite low. The same report shows some evidence that taxation 
increased in the first years after the crisis (but is now at 2010 levels). Of course, the 
high incidence of tax evasion in Greece casts some doubt on the validity of these 
figures. On the indirect taxation side, VAT now (April 2017) stands at 24%.   
 
The final two columns reveal one basic reason for the country’s underlying economic 
malaise: the rapid rise in costs (in relation to other countries) which translated into a 
rise in unit labour costs that could not now be compensated by currency depreciation 
and concomitant loss of competitiveness. As a result of the combined (and to some 
Year RGDP Unemp  Pri Budget Budget Debt RURL CA 
2001 82.7 10.8 0.8 -5.5 107.1 74.3 -9.8 
2007 104.7 84 -2.2 -6.7 103.1 83.3 -15.2 
2009 100 9.6 -10.1 -15.1 126.7 85.8 -12.4 
2013 77 27.5 -9.1 -13.2 177.4 87.6 -2.0 
2016 78.8 24.8 2.3 -1.1 180 90.3  1.76 
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extent overlapping) forces of loss of competitiveness, rise in consumption and decline 
in saving and the government budget deficits, the external balance (current account) 
deteriorated dramatically in the run-up to the crisis; it has improved since then but this 
is due much more to the drops in imports as a result of the recession than a sustained 
increase in exports. Competitiveness and external (im)balances will be touched upon 
in various places in this volume, particularly Chapter 16 by Bournakis and Tsoukis. 
Since the onset of the crisis, competitiveness has been improving due to the decline in 
wages (in polite lingo, this is the ‘internal devaluation’ process), but an improvement 
in exports remains at once a serious challenge and a paramount objective for a 




4. Looking for culprits: What went wrong 
 
As with the possible flaws of the Eurozone (if any), so too is there rather little 
agreement on why Greece found itself at the eye of the storm. There has been a 
chronic tendency for rather profligate public spending and precarious public finances. 
Public debt/GDP has been slightly over the 100% marks since at least the early 1990s 
and the budget deficit has been persistently negative over that period. So much is 
agreed upon; the difficulty is to understand clearly the processes that led to this: 
Dysfunctionalities of the Greek political system (clientellism, tax evasion, corruption; 
the official statistics showing the state of the public finances had been ‘doctored’); 
weak growth, de-industrialisation, negative FDI flows (Greece was one of the major 
investors in the Balkans and Eastern Europe in the 1990s) that may have crowded out 
domestic investment; or simply a ‘historical accident’ of some imprudent and 
incompetent governments. All these features have no doubt played a role, but there 
will be scant agreement on which is the most fundamental.  
 
A factor that is rarely mentioned is demographic change. Greece’s Total Fertility Rate 
was 2.4 in 1970, 2.23 in 1980 then down to 1.4 in 1990 and about 1.35 now, lower 
since 1990 than the EU-28 average that now is about 1.5 – OECD data – and well 
below the 2.1 rate that is required in order to keep a population steady. So, the country 
went from having one of the healthiest demographic pyramids in Western Europe to 
one of the weakest in the space of a few short decades. As reported in the New York 
Times (2017), many of the trends are shared among southern European countries and 
are exacerbated by the crisis: About half of the women born after 1970 will remain 
childless; many of the young will emigrate. Apart from the well-known consequences 
for national insurance and pensions, these developments will no doubt have long-run 
implications on fiscal systems, productivity and entrepreneurship. It is intuitively 
obvious that an aging population will increase the collective discount factor: all else 
equal, there will be less appetite for long-term solutions due to the more limited 
biological horizons. Such developments also cast immigration, another challenge 
currently facing Greece and Italy in particular, into a different light: In the longer run, 
young immigrant populations will play a key role towards demographic and fiscal 
balance. Demographic developments are surely part of the explanation for Greece’s 
slide towards crisis, but it is beyond our scope to evaluate their precise contribution.  
 
The unsustainable public funding of the pension system deserves a special mention 
here. Former Minister of Work and Pensions (2000-1) and respected authority on the 
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economics of national insurance, Yannitsis (2016) provides some glaring statistics. 
The ‘replacement ratio’ (gross pensions to final salary) was the highest among OECD 
countries in 2009 at 95.7%. Since the onset of the crisis, this ratio fell dramatically 
(following the general falling trend but more so) and stood at 57.9% in 2013; still 
above the OECD average but only fractionally so (Table 6, p. 67). The public sector 
contributed well above 5% each year after 2000 towards plugging the funding holes 
of the national insurance system, reaching a whopping 9.7% in 2009. In other words, 
the largest part of the budget deficits of recent years was probably due to the public 
sector subsidising pensions. However, total spending on pensions was not particularly 
excessive: it stood at 13.8% of GDP in 2009, slightly above the EU-28 average of 
13.2%. Since the crisis, pensions have been drastically reduced in both public and 
private sectors (often of the order of 40%), but the total percentage in terms of GDP 
increased to 16% in 2014 as output fell and more employees were incentivised to 
retire early. As a result of these tendencies and of the ‘haircut’ of PSI in which the 
government bonds that pension funds held in large amounts were wiped out, despite 
the drastic cuts in pensions across the board and despite the repeated overhaul of the 
system, the pension system’s finances remain unsustainable. The topic is becoming a 
focal point of generational conflict as the old are rapidly sinking into poverty while 
the young are called upon to fund much more generous pension provision than what 
they will themselves enjoy: There is in fact a vicious circle where the drop in GDP 
weakens further the pension system’s finances and necessitates fresh cuts, which are 
recessionary. Together with the Non-Performing Loans owed to banks (NPLs - see 
Chapter 13 by Tzavalis, Charalambakis and Dendramis), this mechanism is part and 
parcel of a strongly recessionary ‘fiscal multiplier’ as argued by Tsoukis in Chapter 
(10). As with competitiveness and exports, finding a sustainable footing for national 
insurance remains a serious challenge and a paramount objective on the country’s way 
to recovery.   
 
Looking for culprits (causes that is, not people), it is worth debunking two myths: 
Firstly, Greece does not have an excessive government sector by historical and 
comparative standards. Historically, Greece’s total government spending has followed 
international trends, being close to the average of OECD and EU-15 countries. 
Around 40-45% of GDP for most of the 1990s and 2000s, it was about 45% on the 
eve of the crisis (2008). This was by no means excessive; the only deviation from the 
norm was perhaps that while everywhere there was a tendency for retrenchment from 
about 2000 on, in Greece that was not the case and there was even an increase in 
spending from 2007 with the onset of the international financial crisis. A similar story 
is told by the number of civil servants in wider government. Iordanoglou (2010) 
shows that in 2008 there were about one million public sector employees, or about 
22% of the labour force. This is comparable to the EU-15 average of 21%. Greece did 
not stand out in terms of composition of spending or taxes, either. What was of course 
different, were the excessive (and hidden) deficits that were built from 2007 on.  
 
Secondly, it is argued sometimes that credit growth played a part in the crisis 
(Gourinchas, Philippon and Vayanos, 2016). In this regard, it is worth emphasising 
that the bank-assets-to-GDP ratio in Greece was 173% in 2008, the lowest in the 
Eurozone (see Baldwin and Giavazzi, 2015b, Table 2). This is an indication of the 
fact that the country’s banking sector was in a good shape prior to the crisis; the crisis 
was not due to weak banking as, e.g., in Ireland. With the onset of the crisis, the 
‘haircut’ of private debt of 2012 (PSI) and the drastic rise of non-performing loans 
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(close to 50% in 20016), the banking sector went into difficulties requiring successive 
rounds of re-capitalisation. But it should be clear that the banking sector was a victim, 
not a culprit.  
 
With bank assets-GDP as an indicator of private debt, it is evident that both private 
and total (public+private) indebtedness were one of the lowest in the Eurozone.  
Interestingly, Weder Di Mauro (2015) argues that high total indebtedness was the 
main cause of the Eurozone crisis. That aside, there is a political economy corollary 
from this point: what seems to have happened in Greece is that the indebtedness was 
shifted from private to public sector. The culture, that the political system fails to 
correct and indeed crystallises, is one that views the public sphere (and finances) as a 
common pool for unlimited grazing. This results in a heightened ‘tragedy of the 
commons’ which eventually came to haunt us. 
 
Iversen, Soskice and Hope (2016) and Streek (2015) both place the well-documented 
imbalances in Europe in a varieties of capitalism-theoretic framework, contrasting 
northern, efficiency-driven and export-oriented countries and economies, with the 
economically statist, domestic demand-led economies of the south. This general 
schema seems a good starting point for analysing the Greek experience; to which one 
should add de-industrialisation, demographic change and the impact on the pensions 
system, and the country’s dysfunctional political system. All these factors have been 
commented upon, except de-industrialisation. Indeed, back in the 197s and 80s, 
Greece seems to have suffered from the premature de-industrialisation that Rodrik 
(2015) identified for Latin American, sub-Saharan African and other emerging 
economies a generation later.     
 
Regarding the macroeconomic dynamics that unfolded in the run-up to and 
immediately after the crisis (i.e. the years around 2010), Gourinchas, Philippon and 
Vayanos (2016) seem right when they suggest that there existed a toxic combination 
of faulty fiscal policies, credit growth and weak and asymmetric macroeconomic 
performances. For those versed in macroeconomics, this is displayed in the well-
known ‘three-gaps’ equation of National Income Accounting: 
 
 S-I + T-G = X-Im  
 
where 
S: private saving 
I: private investment 
T: taxes 




A number of interpretations can be given to this equation, but for our purposes it says 
that the credit-fuelled boom (low/negative S-I) plus a government deficit (T-G<0) 
were matched by an external trade deficit and concomitant capital inflows. Around 
the time of the crisis, all the deficits burst: so, the crisis was characterised by a 
‘sudden stop’ (on the RHS above, external borrowing dried up), sovereign default (G-
T>0 had to be corrected) and the bursting of the lending boom (reflected on S-I). But 
as argued, the lending boom did not burst until after 2009, which leaves the internal 
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(government budget) and external (trade deficit and capital inflows) imbalances as the 
key actors of the drama.  
 
As with all accounting identities, this equation does not reveal which of the three 
ultimately drove the others; in technical language, it does not reveal causation. 
Regarding the relation between the internal (government budget) and external 
(im)balances, the well-known ‘twin deficits hypothesis’ suggests that causality runs 
from the former to the latter; but it may also be argued that weak export performance 
(and hence external balance) may prompt stronger government spending, thus 
causality could also conceivably run the other way around (as well). Indeed, 
constructing a novel and detailed data set on wealth and its various aspects (external 
and government wealth), Ippolyte (2016) argues that the external indebtedness was 
equally, if not more, important as a cause of the crisis than government debt. Thus, 
and in line with the analyses in Baldwin and Giavazzi (2015a, b), the Greek crisis 
could be understood as a classic balance of payments crisis in a European context, 
whereby hot money flows from north to south financed the pre-crisis boom; in this 
respect, the argument goes, Greece was no different than the other peripheral EU 
countries, except that it had a larger government sector. We have seen that this is 
probably an accurate statement, except in so far as the government sector covered the 
generous and unfunded social security provision. So, a more nuanced view may be 
that the country showed a tendency for public profligacy and a private sector that, all 
said, lived above its means during the euro years; but these tendencies were allowed 
(if not encouraged) by the abundant capital inflows that developed in the context of an 




5. A chronology of the crisis  
 
As already mentioned, the period following 1981 was a period of precarious public 
finances in Greece: Between 1980 and 1993 the Greek public debt, as a percentage of 
GDP, rose from approximately 28% to almost 112%. Except for the years preceding 
the entry of Greece into the European Monetary Union (EMU), the high levels of 
public debt were also accompanied by large primary deficits. This all came to a head 
in October 2009, when the newly elected centre-left government of G. Papandreou 
revealed that the actual government deficit as a percentage of GDP was going to be 
12.7, more than double the 6% value that had been previously announced by the 
outgoing centre-right government of K. Karamanlis;
1
 the preliminary phase of the 
crisis had arrived. This announcement alerted financial markets to the country’s 
parlous state of government finances but also to the possibility of structural 
weaknesses in the Eurozone. The country’s creditworthiness was immediately and 
seriously undermined. From 22 October to 23 December 2009, Greece's credit rating 
was downgraded by all three credit rating agencies, leading thus to increased interest 
rates on Greek bonds. To address the concerns of the European finance ministers’ 
regarding the size of the Greek public debt and gain back the trust of investors and EU 
partners, the Papandreou government passed a series of austerity measures, but to no 
avail. By late April 2010, the spread between the yield on Greek and German 10-year 
bonds had surpassed 1000 basis points, making borrowing by the Greek government 
                                                 
1
 The final revised figure was 15.4%. 
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prohibitively expensive and casting doubt over its ability to re-finance existing public 
debt.  In light of this, and a €16bn debt maturing in May, Papandreou was forced to 
request financial assistance from European fellow governments: The crisis had 
formally arrived.  
 
The exact deliberations under which the bailout was agreed are shrouded somewhat in 
mystery – see below. On 2 May, the IMF, the European Commission and the 
European Central Bank (ECB), collectively (and somewhat pejoratively) known  as 
‘Troika’ later turned to the more politically correct ‘Institutions’, agreed to offer a 
three-year rescue package of €110bn (of which 80 were by the EU and the rest from 
the IMF). In return, the Greek government undertook to implement an Adjustment 
Programme involving a series of cuts in public spending and structural reforms 
prescribed in the associated (first) ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ (‘First 
Memorandum’ for short). But the initial plan (and optimism) that the country would 
be able to return to markets on its own by 2012 proved widely off the mark: Not 
surprisingly, the fiscal consolidation proved deeply recessionary; so much so that (for 
instance) the IMF repeatedly failed to forecast accurately and had to downgrade its 
own forecasts (see Blanchard and Leigh, 2013). As a result of the decrease in GDP 
and the new loans, the debt-to-GDP ratio was on the rise. By 27 July 2011, Greece's 
credit rating was downgraded to just a step above “junk.” Following such adverse 
events, the government of G. Papandreou was forced to resign later in the year. It was 
succeeded by a coalition government under L. Papademos, a respected technocrat, 
former Governor of the Bank of Greece and Vice President of the ECB. This 
government requested and agreed a second Adjustment Programme on 21 February 
2012, involving a loan of €130bn in exchange for another package of austerity 
measures and structural reforms (the ‘Second Memorandum’).  
 
By the end of 2011, government debt was €356bn, or 172% of GDP. Such a level of 
indebtedness was widely seen as unsustainable (not least by the IMF), prompting 
discussions and initiatives for its reduction. In Spring that year, a debt restructuring 
program (the ‘Private Sector Involvement’ or PSI) was completed. This involved 
swapping about €205bn of privately held Greek government debt (including 10bn of 
government-guaranteed debt of public sector enterprises) with new bonds issued by 
the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) and new government bonds. The swap 
involved both a considerable reduction in the face value of privately-held debt 
(‘haircut’) of about €107bn or 56% of 2012 GDP (but note that the debt owed to the 
ECB was excluded from this) and an extension of maturities, as both new bonds were 
of longer maturities than the bonds they replaced. The careful study of Zettelmeyer, 
Trebesch and Gulati (2013) calculates that in present value terms, the reduction in 
debt was of the order of 60-65%. To this, one should add about 10% reduction (in 
present value terms) achieved by the second phase, the debt buy-back (involving 
buying back of the newly issued bonds) of December 2012. At the end of the process, 
in December 2012, about 35bn euros of Greek government debt remained in private 
hands, or about 13% of what existed in May 2010, at the onset of the crisis. Even 
allowing for 25bn new loans that were provided to Greece in order to re-capitalise its 
banks that were hit by the haircut (as they were holding large amounts of Greek 
government bonds), Zettelmeyer et al. (2013) calculate that in present value terms, 





This debt restructuring and buy-back was clearly the world’s largest sovereign debt 
restructuring ever. The next such operation was Argentina’s 2005 debt exchange, 
which only allowed a transfer of about 22.5% of GDP. Critics, starting from the 
careful analysis of Zettelmeyer et al. (2013) but also IMF (2015, para. 46, p. 38), 
Wyplosz (Chapter 3 here), Pisani-Ferry (2013) and many others (including our 
contributors Grahl, Chapter 4 and Bratsiotis and Cobham, Chapter 5) argue that this 
restructuring and haircut was too little, too late. It should have happened at the onset 
of the crisis in 2010 or soon after. It thus failed in its main objective, which was to 
place on Greek government debt on a sustainable footing; which soon after started 
rising again (see Table 1). And although it was a carefully designed and executed, 
complex legal operation, it could have achieved more for Greece. Finally, there was 
‘collateral damage’ in the heavy losses inflicted on domestic holders of Greek debt:   
- Greek pension funds, contributing to the vicious circle that enveloped the pensions 
system, as analysed; 
- Greek banks; those received a recapitalisation sweetener of 25bn euros which 
however was registered under Greek debt; and ownership changed hands as a result 
of that; 
- Cypriot banks that were similarly exposed but were not entitled to recapitalisation, 
thus leading to the Cypriot ‘bail-in’ of March 2013 (Michaelides, 2014).  
 
Fresh elections took place in May and again in June 2012, which led to the formation 
of another coalition government headed by the centre-right party leader A. Samaras. 
Despite the new bailout program and the austerity put in place, there were no signs of 
recovery by the end of 2014. The government of A. Samaras was also essentially 
forced to declare early elections. On 25 January 2015, the left-wing SYRIZA won the 
elections on the promise of ending all austerity and getting the country out of the 
previously signed two Memoranda; a new coalition government was formed with the 
small, right-wing party of Independent Greeks (ANEL). With the flamboyant Y. 
Varoufakis in office as new Finance Minister, a long process of negotiation with the 
lenders started, which lasted until June. Varoufakis’ (and Greece’s) main argument 
was that the policies mandated by the three ‘Institutions’ (|EU Commission, ECB and 
IMF, or ‘Troika’) were recessionary and led to an austerity-debt vicious spiral. 
Creditors, while recognising Greece’s substantial efforts in undertaking adjustment 
and stabilisation policies, maintained that Greece needed to pursue the structural 
reform agenda in a more determined manner.  Without a final agreement between 
Greece and the three Institutions and the expiration of the second bailout programme 
just around the corner, in June the ECB froze the Emergency Liquidity Assistance 
(ELA) for Greece, which was the main mechanism for providing liquidity to Greek 
banks. Matters came to a head when Greece was offered a “take it or leave it” deal in 
the Euro Group meeting of 27 June 2015. At that point, Prime Minister Tsipras 
announced a referendum on a new bailout agreement on offer for 5 July. Following 
the announcement, all banks in Greece were closed and strict capital controls were 
imposed. On 30 June, Greece became the first developed economy to miss a payment 
on an IMF loan and fall into arrears. The pre-referendum period was very short 
(barely a week) but the atmosphere quite tense; talk of ‘Grexit’ (from the euro) 
abound across the world. Despite an over 61% vote against a new bailout agreement, 
the Tsipras government was eventually forced to accept a deal for a new €86bn 
bailout programme extended over three years (the Third ‘Memorandum’). It is worth 
pointing out, and that is a widely shared interpretation invoked by Tsipras, that at 
every point, the great majority in the country advocated staying inside the euro; the 
11 
 
proponents of a new drachma were a narrow minority. Tsipras’ argument was that the 
referendum result was against the bailout and its terms, not the euro.    
 
Nonetheless, signing the new bailout agreement was a humiliating volte face for 
Tsipras; despite this, SYRIZA was voted again into power in snap elections in 
September 2015. With the mild-mannered E. Tsakalotos having replaced Varoufakis 
as Finance Minister, the SYRIZA government continues the same course as 
predecessor governments: keep taking the (bitter) pill of compliance with the 
Memoranda in an effort to meet the creditors’ demands, secure financing and keep the 
country in the euro. Nearly one and a half years later, at the time of writing, the same 
themes dominate the news agenda: Creditors accuse Greece that it fails to comply (or 
does so only half-heartedly) with the provisions that it has signed; while Greece is 
wary of seven years of painful austerity and recessionary policy measures. Despite 
Grexit having waned from view (partly eclipsed by discussions around Brexit), there 
continues to be some uncertainty regarding the implementation of the third 
‘Memorandum’ and its associated conditionality.  Disagreements between the Greek 
government and the creditors regarding the reforms that are necessary to restore the 
country’s competitiveness and jumpstart the economy delay the closure of the second 
review of the programme. As a result, Greece remains outside the ECB’s Quantitative 




6. Current outlook and prospects 
 
Though talk of Grexit has disappeared from the discussion, the Greek bailout process 
is not over. Currently, there is a review of compliance by Greece to the conditions set 
by the Institutions (creditors) (that Greece has – supposedly - agreed to) in order for a 
new tranche of about €7bn of funds to be released in July 2017 to finance maturing 
bonds. At issue is further reform of labour markets – the call is for further 
liberalisation, further reform of pensions, and further fiscal consolidation (on both 
sides of the balance, i.e. further cuts in wages and other expenditures and increases in 
taxes) and privatisations. Greece has already achieved a record adjustment, as 
mentioned, with 2016 having ended with a record primary budget surplus of 3.9% and 
an overall surplus of 0.7% (figures confirmed by Eurostat 24/4/2017). At stake now is 
whether such surpluses are sustainable in the medium term. The issue of whether such 
conditionality, further structural  reforms (or liberalisation) and austerity make sense 
will be touched upon below and will be taken up at various places in this volume, 
particularly in Chapters 3 by Rodrik, 6 by Karanasos et al., and 11 by Tsoukis.   
 
Two particular issues that currently fuel uncertainty concern the participation of the 
IMF and the longer horizon. Acknowledging the fact that, at about 180% of GDP, 
Greece’s debt remains unsustainable (IMF, 2015) and bound by its constitution not to 
lend when the probability of recovering the loans is not high, the IMF appears 
reluctant to renew its funding when it expires and wishes only to provide technical 
(advisory) assistance. The EU on the other hand wants the IMF to play a full part in 
the bailout (that is the condition under which the Third Memorandum and bailout was 
voted through by the German Parliament). The IMF wishes to see a further reduction 
in Greek debt (if not a nominal haircut, at least a prolongation of maturities and 
reduction of interest rates), something resisted by the EU; it argues that persistent 
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primary surpluses of the order of 3.5% of GDP currently agreed until at least 2020 if 
not longer are not sustainable for long. Against this, the IMF wants to see a more 
drastic reform and liberalization agenda, though the latest pronouncements 
(interviews by C. Lagarde and M. Obstfeld before the Spring Assembly) suggest that 
the IMF thinks that Greece has already done enough on this front (see also the blog by 
Hagan, Obstfeld and Thomsen, 2017). So, currently the exact terms accompanying the 
pending tranche of €7bn remain yet to be finalised; and the discussions about a further 
debt relief are being pushed back yet again. The second point of uncertainty is what 
happens after the end of the current (third) Memorandum and financing programme; 
the German government has made it clear that there will not be another one. This 
implies that if Greece wants to stay in the euro, it must raise the funds required for it 
to meet the interest and maturing bond payments from 2019 and beyond in the 
markets.  
 
Nominal debt remains persistently high but its maturity structure has been changed at 
various points and is now quite long; interest rates are very low. These features have 
been facilitated by the fact that that almost all the debt, following the PSI of 2012, is 
now official (owed to the ECB, European Stability Mechanism – ESM, national 
governments and the IMF). As a result, in present value terms, Greece’s debt has been 
calculated as no more than 100% of GDP (Schumacher and Weder di Mauro, 2015; 
the IMF’s estimates are in IMF 2015, 2016); see Chapter 7  by Wickens for more on 
the country’s fiscal (in)solvency. To conclude this part, we review the schedule of 
payments that need to be made from now on and the cost of servicing the debt in the 
years ahead (Figures 1 and 2). It has been pointed out that the average interest rate 
and the cost of servicing the debt is one of the lowest in Europe and the lowest Greece 
has had in the past 20 years (Christodoulakis, 2016). All these features suggest that 
the debt should be sustainable. We return to the issue of debt sustainability below 





Figure 1: Greek Debt Maturity Profile 
 
  
Noes: As of 31-12-17; unit: millions of euro; source: Public Debt Management Agency of Greece 
(PDMA), accessed 8/4/17. http://www.pdma.gr/en/public-debt-strategy/public-debt/maturity-profile-en 
 
 
Figure 2: Greek public debt: Cost of annual funding and average maturity  
 
 
Notes: Weighted average cost of annual funding (as a % of GDP, RHS) and average maturity (LHS) as 





7. Taking stock  
 
The purpose of this section is to take stock and critically evaluate, to the extent 
possible, the process so far. Starting from the obvious, Greece went essentially 
bankrupt in 2010 and was only able to state afloat with the ‘clinical support system’ 
of EU and IMF financial assistance. Clearly, this assistance enabled the country to 
avoid a disorderly default and a concomitant fiscal correction overnight; in which 
case, the economic and social cost would have been a lot higher. Greece borrowed 
from countries even poorer than itself so that it could maintain a fraction of its former 
living standards and it is grateful for this support. It also became clear quickly (though 
only implicitly) what a disorderly default would have implied: Exit from the euro; 
which the vast majority of public opinion in Greece always wanted to avoid, as 
mentioned. Against this, the country has paid and continues to pay a heavy price in 
terms of fallen living standards, high unemployment and rampant impoverishment of 
large swathes of former middle classes (particularly pensioners). Though some 
measure of growth will sooner or later return, it will take decades for living standards 
to be restored and unemployment to come down to normal levels (on that, see Chapter 
12 by Bournakis and Christopoulos).  
 
Because of labour market weakness but also under the guise of structural reforms, the 
labour market is in practice completely liberalised and deregulated – with only token 
bargaining, wages in arrears and (illegal) payments in kind; non-performing loans due 
to banks are now close to the 50% mark, the stock market and housing market 
practically dead (on all these, see Tsoukis, Chapter 10), banks in repeated need of re-
capitalisation and now practically owned by the ESM; public enterprises – even 
profitable ones – are up for fire-sale: Greece is a different country than a few years 
ago and, whether good or bad, inevitable or not, much more neoliberal. Not all is bad 
though: As part of the conditionality, the country has had to modernise: The Statistical 
Authority (ELSTAT), the Public Debt Management Agency, the Public Revenues 
Authority, all now are independent authorities with executive powers; political 
meddling with them is no longer possible. There is a more concerted drive for 
combating tax evasion; there is a renewed drive for reducing red tape and increasing 
transparency. At the same time, serious challenges remain, listed in no particular 
order: Increasing competitiveness and the economy’s export orientation (see Chapter 
16 by Bournakis and Tsoukis); further reform of the pensions system, part cause and 
part effect of the current malaise; reform of the tax system, with the aim of making it 
simpler and fairer and of reducing tax evasion; reform of the public sector, making it 
more productive and efficient; reform of the justice system which is impartial but 
overloaded and very slow. The list goes on.    
 
Is this all inevitable? Could it have happened differently and could the country been 
spared the hardship? Discussion of these and many other related questions often 
revolves around two narratives. We present the outlines of the arguments here, while 
we take up more specific points as the discussion unfolds later on. The ‘mainstream’ 
narrative (Feld, Schmidt, Schnabel, Weigert and Wieland, 2015; Feld, 2016; Feld, 
Schmidt, Schnabel and Wieland, 2016) recognises that the prescribed path is hard but 
argues that it provides generous financial assistance, in contravention to the EU 
Treaties that do not allow bail-outs, and will eventually lead to recovery. As part of 
the assistance, the generous PSI of 2012 took place and the official debt is offered on 
generous terms, both allowing a drastic write-down of Greek debt in present-value 
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terms. The narrative argues that the assistance is provided against promises to put 
public finances in order and to engage in reforms of the labour and product markets 
that will restore growth. Thus, the ‘mainstream’ narrative is constructed around basic 
logic and principles of international finance, but also ‘ordoliberal’ principles of 
respect for rules, ‘hard budget constraints’, ‘liability-and-control’ and the balance 
between rights and obligations. All these are required to safeguard and cement a union 
between sovereign states and buttress the credibility of the euro. It recognises the 
conflict of interest between creditors and debtors but argues that no creditor would 
want to lose money. It lays down ‘red lines’ in precluding any permanent transfer 
systems such as outright debt forgiveness, eurobonds or more fiscal transfers in the 
EU other than the existing ones (from the Structural Funds). This line of thinking 
barely mentions the German debt forgiveness of 1953 (of which Greece was a 
signatory); of course, circumstances were different.   
 
The ‘critical’ narrative takes aim at the overall direction of the conditionality 
programme as well as the specific policy choices of the crisis; in this light, it argues 
that the hardship is unnecessary. Literature here abounds and we draw liberally from 
Ardagna and Caselli (2014), Baldwin and Giavazzi (2015), Copelovitch et al. (2016), 
Moravcsik (2012), Streek (2015), Watkins (2013, 2014) and Wyplosz (Chapter 2 in 
this volume), as well as renowned economic commentators such as Paul Krugman and 
Simon Wren-Lewis, among others; this literature, often critical in varying shades, 
offers valuable perspectives and critiques of the Greek and broader eurozone crisis. In 
our volume, the ‘critical’ narrative is represented by Chapter 2 by Wyplosz, 4 by 
Grahl, 5 by Bratsiotis and Cobham and 6 by Karanasos et al. The ‘critical’ narrative 
would start from the fact that Greece’s malaise is inextricably bound with the 
Eurozone’s structural weaknesses and asymmetries; the deficits of Greece (and the 
wider southern EU) were permitted (financed) by the north’s surpluses and hot money 
flows. Against that two-sided coin, the burden of adjustment falls entirely on debtors. 
That is of course true, except that non-one noticed, much less complained, when that 
was happening. And Greece’s fiscal profligacy (and sugar-coated if not downright 
cooked statistics) is undeniable. Equally undeniable is however the fact that the 
burden of adjustment is asymmetric as are the benefits of the euro (Moravcsik, 2012; 
Granville, 2016). Furthermore, this narrative notes the political asymmetries of an 
inter-governmentalist, German-led Europe, with the Bundestag and the German 
Supreme Court being the arbiters of the major decisions; the largely cosmetic 
European Parliament has sunk further into unimportance, being a collateral damage of 
the crisis. On the policy front, the harsh austerity has drawn sharp criticism; as has the 
fact that the PSI was too little/too late; and the fact that when the ECB withdrew 
liquidity from Greek banks in June 2015, forcing the imposition of capital controls, it 
contravened its own constitution as a Central Bank co-owned by Greece (Wyplosz, 
Chapter 2). Against that, one could argue that there was no way that policy mistakes 
could not have been committed in such a process of sailing into uncharted waters and 
that we are all wiser after the fact. 
 
Any concrete balance sheet should include the actual financial flows, the ‘smoking 
gun’: Following the careful studies of Rocholl and Stahmer (2016) and Triantopoulos 
(2015), we have a clear idea about how the monies from the First and Second 
Programmes (of 2010 and 2012) were disposed: According to the first of these 
studies, these programmes amounted to €215.9bn in disbursed funds, €73bn from the 
first programme (against a planned amount of €110bn) and €142.9bn from the second 
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programme (planned: €140bn). In sum, the IMF disbursed €32 billion and the EU 
€183.9bn. Importantly, Rocholl and Stahmer (2016) calculated that only €9.7bn, or 
less than 5% of the total amount of €215.9bn, directly contributed to the Greek 
budget. More than 64% (€139.2bn) was used to service existing debt (repay maturing 
bonds and make interest payments); 17% (€37.3bn) was used to recapitalise Greek 
banks, while the remaining 14% (€29.7bn) provided incentives for investors to engage 
in the Private Sector Involvement (PSI) in March 2012. Triantopoulos (2015) reports 




Next come the motives. Going back to the start of the crisis in May 2010, there seems 
to have been some initial German reluctance for a rescue; this was later overcome at 
American insistence. Key must have been the realisation that a Greek disorderly 
default would have jeopardised the viability of major German and French banks that 
were heavily exposed in loans to Greece (and were fresh from the tumult of 2007-9); 
and would have perhaps fatally undermine the euro itself (whose credibility would 
have suffered a major blow with the first departure). Critics argue that the main 
motive was to save the banks rather than Greece, but further cash for banks in the 
wake of the financial crisis would be politically unacceptable, hence it was disguised 
as saving Greece (Ardagna and Caselli, 2014; Watkins, 2014). Moreover, the PSI and 
‘haircut’ of 2012 was only agreed after the said banks had unwound their positions in 
Greek debt (Watkins, 2014). 
 
But no rescue package could be unconditional: ‘No guarantees without control,’ said 
Mrs Merkel according to then US Finance Secretary Tim Geithner’s memoirs (see 
Watkins, 2014). Thus, the EU requested the technical assistance of the IMF which had 
a long experience in adjustment programmes (‘conditionality’) related to bailouts. 
Yet, as discussed in Chapter 10 by Tsoukis, such conditionality is by no means 
uncontroversial. We have already seen that the IMF has consistently underestimated 
the recessionary effects of austerity in Greece (Blanchard and Leigh, 2013; Pisani-
Ferry, Sapir and Wolff, 2013; Wyplosz, 2017); we comment below on what appears 
to be a recent shift in the IMF’s thinking on Greece. Broader experience from 
countries which have gone through such programmes is at best mixed; at worst, 
downright negative (Barro and Lee, 2005; see also Dreher, 2009). The literature 
argues almost with one voice that a pre-condition for success of adjustment 
programmes is ‘ownership’, the wholehearted espousal of the reform agenda by the 
country in question (see Dreher, 2009, and the many studies he cites); furthermore, 
ownership should be construed not only as the willingness to carry out a program, but 
also as the technical capacity to design and implement it and the political ability to do 
so (Drazen and Isard, 2004). As Rodrik (Chapter 3) analyses, none of these conditions 
is in place in Greece; all recipes were designed outside the country, being a ‘laundry 
list’ of clichés as opposed to a series of carefully thought out, prioritised reforms that 
address the key ‘binding constraints’ that impede growth. Surely a VAT of 24% 
contradicts the main objective of achieving competitiveness. Moreover, as Tsoukis 
(Chapter 10) suggests, the theorem of the ‘second-best tells us that such structural 
reforms will work in a reasonably well-functioning economy; in abnormal situations, 
more reforms may lead us away from the main objectives: Structural reforms, much 
needed in many cases from a long-term perspective, will be recessionary in the short 
                                                 
2
 We thank Professor P. Liargovas and Dr. A. Lyras of the Parliamentary Budget Office for helpful 
information on these matters.   
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run and therefore counter-productive. The ‘mainstream’ counter-narrative is that 
Greece’s main problem is that it never produced a coherent plan of its own; and it has 
only half-heartedly adopted and implemented the reforms. Apparent on both sides, 
creditors and Greece, is a kind of fatigue: Ardagna and Caselli (2014) speak of a 
Laffer Curve of reform effort and political will. From Greece’s point of view, there is 
a feeling that whatever the country does is never enough, and more will be asked in 
the next round of negotiations.  
 
Debt remains a point of contention between Greece and creditors. As we have seen, it 
is persistently high, prompting calls for further debt relief (see e.g. Pisani-Ferry, 
2016). But (the mainstream view would argue, with some justification) its profile and 
average cost of service render it sustainable (see Christodoulakis, 2016). Against this, 
financial markets will know the debt overhang, and the resulting premia and overall 
uncertainty will postpone recovery. For this reason, Greece’s standard demand is 
further debt relief, a demand that meets the steadfast refusal of creditors (Feld, 2016); 
the argument is that the PSI, maturity extension and lowering of interest rates were 
generous enough and a further face-value haircut is out of the question. In any case, 
there has been talk of a further debt relief (in the form of altering the profile, not 
nominal cut) since 2012; every time, a possible settlement is getting postponed till 
after ‘the completion of the current programme’.  
 
The political asymmetries related to the crisis have been mentioned; they apply to 
Greece in an amplified way. Though the theory is that the Troika of Institutions will 
not ‘dictate in detail’ the adjustment programme and the reform process (Feld et al., 
2015), the theory is far from the practice: There is in fact micro-management of a 
rather humiliating kind, that erodes both sovereignty (when important policies are 
dictated to the country by low-key technocrats) and democracy (when Parliament is 
reduced to rubber-stumping take-it-or-leave-it ‘offers’ of agreements). Rodrik (2010) 
drew an early lesson from the Greek experience, noting the incompatible trilemma of 
economic globalisation, political democracy and the nation-state. There is often talk 
of what creditors may find politically acceptable with their electorates and such 
considerations did indeed inform the terms of the assistance packages that Greece and 
the other countries got (Blanchard, 2012, 2015) but never what terms debtors may 
find politically acceptable. In terms of wider politics, there have been five national 
elections since September 2009, resulting in four Prime Ministers (excluding care-
takers). In a country where government and Prime Ministers used to stay in office 
normally for the best part of a decade, this despair-fuelled ‘high-frequency’ politics 
seems to be the water-mark of the crisis.  
 
8. A proposal 
We pointed out above that one may discern two narratives about the Greek crisis, the 
mainstream one that argues essentially that Greece must continue to take the bitter 
pills and the critical one that argues that the country has suffered gratuitously (this is 
of course to exaggerate and over-simplify). We finish with a third, ‘middle-of-the-
road’ narrative and a policy proposal that follows from it. This recognises the harsh 
reality of the (any, in fact) adjustment programme as inevitable; it argues that 
financial assistance was both necessary and generous, and is agnostic about various 
18 
 
aspects of the other narratives, bypassing any questions of fairness. The main point is 
that the current conditionality is self-defeating as it keeps the country in recession (se 
e.g. House and Tesar, 2017 for estimates; and Chapter 10 for more details); in doing 
so, it violates some of the key ‘commandments’ of proper fiscal adjustments 
stipulated by Blanchard and Cotarelli (2010) and much macroeconomic analysis 
related to the ‘fiscal multiplier’ (see the Chapter). As a result, the present-value of the 
receipts (primary surpluses) that creditors will receive is lower than it could be, even 
though the mandated surpluses are quite high. To this, one may add the related 
criticism of Eichengreen and Panizza (2014) that such high surpluses are not 
sustainable for long, either economically or politically. The Chapter’s analysis shows 
the existence of a ‘debt Laffer Curve’ with a maximum sustainable primary surplus 
that maximises the present value of payments to creditors while at the same time 
returning the country to growth. The policy corollary of this analysis is that the 
primary objective now should be a return to growth by a combination of partial 
relaxation of austerity (as argued in Chapter 10 by Tsoukis) and an agenda of focused 
structural reforms targeted at the main ‘bottlenecks’ that hinder growth and export 
performance, as pointed out in Chapter 3 by Rodrik. The pursuit of excessive austerity 
is self-defeating, while, as Chapter 16 by Bournakis and Tsoukis argues, an 
improvement in competitiveness takes much more than a simple (and drastic) internal 
devaluation and broad-brush but unfocused reforms. All of this of course requires 
Greece to formulate its own credible reform agenda and to pursue it vigorously. Some 
additional debt relief, in the form of extension of maturities and reduction in interest 
rates if not outright haircut, may be necessary. And it will be very helpful of the 
required surpluses were growth-indexed, along the lines of Sachs’s (2011) suggestion 
at the outset of the crisis.  
 
 
9. Summary of the contributions to this volume 
 
As mentioned, this volume offers an integrated overview of the Greece’s economy 
and its experience since 2010. The rest (sixteen Chapters) of the volume take up 
themes flagged up in this Introduction in more detail. These contributions are broadly-
based, offering political-economy, macroeconomic as well as sectoral and other 
perspectives on the country, its recent economic history, experience of the crisis and 
prospects. They are written in a way that straddles academic style and more popular 
writing, aiming to be accessible and of interest to a anyone interested not only in the 
Greek experience as such but also the experience of the Euro and European 
integration at large.  
 
In Chapter 2 (The Eurozone crisis: A near-perfect case of mismanagement), Charles 
Wyplosz presents a wide-ranging, sharp criticism of the policy decisions, and 
mistakes, of the Eurozone in the handling of the Greek and wider crises. It is argued 
that the imperfections in the institutional setup contributed a lot to the Eurozone crisis. 
The wrong concept of fiscal discipline, the inability of the ECB to act as lender of last 
resort, absence of a banking union, they all allowed some public debts to increase 
dangerously; the lack of comprehension of the crisis by political leaders led to 
contagion and a deep depression. Some of the institutional flaws have been dealt with, 
but partially so. Existing institutions have been unable to design timely and adequate 
policy responses. The Commission has limited itself to imposing pro-cyclical 
19 
 
austerity policies. The “Community method” has given way to inter-
governmentalism. The dramatic economic and social impact of the crisis has left a 
disastrous perception of Europe, with potentially momentous costs in the long run. 
 
In Chapter 3 (Structural Reforms in the EU), Dani Rodrik reconsiders the notion of 
and rationale for ‘structural reforms’. Structural reforms are changes in labour and 
product markets as well as wider institutional changes that aim to increase the 
efficiency with which labour and capital are allocated in the economy, ensuring that 
these resources go where their contribution to national income is largest. If successful, 
such changes promote productivity, investment and growth. Structural reforms are 
often part of the conditionality accompanying financial assistance, and the assistance 
offered to Greece since 2010 is no exception; in fact, the package of required 
structural reforms is quite demanding. But their positive effects are often grossly 
overestimated; they are uncertain, they accrue only in the long run and will affect (if 
and when) only potential output. Convergence of actual output to potential output is 
very slow, at best. So, Greece, having already achieved a lot in terms of structural 
change, can only benefit marginally from more reforms in the near future. From a 
wider perspective, it is argued that ‘growth accelerations’ (on which the author has 
worked with Ricardo Hausmann and Lant Pritchett) are the results of selective, 
targeted reforms that address the ‘binding constraints’ that an economy faces, the key 
obstacles to growth rather than broad liberalisation and economy-wide reforms. With 
co-authors Ricardo Hausmann and Andres Velasco, the author has identified such 
binding constraints in various economies. In this light, the author argues that the 
broad reforms required of Greece are misplaced; in contrast, a better prioritized 
reform strategy should focus on promoting exports.  
 
‘If you break it, you own it’, argues John Grahl in Chapter 4 (The Responsibility of 
the EU). The author takes a critical political economy approach to the whole strategy 
adopted by the EU and its constituent authorities (ECB, Commission, EFSF and 
ESM) as well as the IMF towards Greece once it became clear that the country is 
insolvent. It argues that the main responsibility for the continuing debacle over a 
country whose debt is of the order of 2% of EU GDP lies with the EU and its overall 
approach – which is not to ignore or downplay the serious failures and weaknesses of 
Greece itself. Particular themes of the critique include the fact that co-responsibility 
for the country’s excessive indebtedness lies also with the lenders who financed the 
exorbitant debts in the first place; but who then were fully rescued, at least in the 
beginning. The country has had very little political clout over the adjustment 
programmes that have been imposed on her, micro-management of which from 
outside seriously erodes its sovereignty and democracy. The resulting austerity has 
been largely self-propagating and self-defeating, plunging the country into a perma-
recession for generations to come, with grave social consequences.   
Germany has played a key role in co-ordinating (and of course, funding) he financial 
assistance that has been provided to Greece and other countries involved in the Euro-
crisis. This the point of departure for George Bratsiotis and David Cobham in Chapter 
5 (On the institutional responses to the Euro crisis: Is there a role for ‘German 
Macroeconomics’?). The authors first ask whether there is something different about 
the macroeconomic thinking that prevails in Germany, which leads the German 
government to argue for different policies from those which many other policymakers 
and economists put forward. They give a qualified positive answer to this question, 
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and then consider the distinctive attitudes held by the German government and/or 
central bank with respect to the process of monetary integration in Europe and then to 
the Eurozone crisis. They argue that German opposition to the use of expansionary 
fiscal policy and of unconventional monetary policy has made a major contribution to 
the failure to deal appropriately with the Greek crisis or to bring about a strong 
recovery in the Eurozone.  
 
The Greek and wider Eurozone crisis (or crises?) have attracted a lot of attention in 
both the academic literatures but also in more popular writings by commentators. At 
the crossroads of these two literatures one can find the writings of academic 
economists who write in blogs and op-eds, exploiting the immediacy and speed that 
technology provides. In Chapter 6 (Austerity and the Greek Dra(ch)ma: Three 
economists’s views and a comment), Menelaos Karanasos, Panagiotis Koutroumpis, 
John Hatgioannides, Marika Karanassou and Hector Sala summarise the opinions of 
three internationally respected authorities (two Nobel laureates among them), namely 
Paul De Grauwe, Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz, on the eurozone crisis as well as 
the Greek case. Thus, this Chapter provides a different angle to much of the 
discussion of this Introduction and the rest of the volume. All three have expressed 
various reservations about the single currency. While De Grauwe and Stiglitz have 
highlighted the design failures of the Eurozone, Krugman has argued that the creation 
of the common currency was a terrible mistake. In support of their claims we provide 
evidence of the negative consequences of the austerity measures that were 
implemented by the troika on the Greek economy for a period covering 2010-2014. 
After seven years of austerity, Greece has experienced significant deflationary 
dynamics, deep recession as well as high unemployment rates. 
 
The departure point of Chapter 7 (A macroeconomic perspective on the Greek debt 
crisis) by Michael Wickens is that, according to the Greece’s credit ratings, the 
probability of default for a 10-year Greek government bond in 2015 was at least 0.4; 
in other words, the country was practically bankrupt. The Chapter investigates how 
this state of affairs arose and what are the policy options for the country to avoid 
default. Part of the problem has been a consequence of its political choices, part a 
failure of fiscal policy and part the result of being in the euro. The political choice 
over the last nearly forty years was to raise the size of the public sector in Greece's 
quest to become more like those of its northern European neighbours. The unfortunate 
fiscal failure was that its tax revenues did not keep pace with its public expenditures 
which resulted in a huge increase in its level of debt. Another political choice, it is 
argued, was the decision to join the euro, which has exacerbated the country’s 
financial problems of Greece. Although the emphasis has been on the debt crisis, as it 
is of immediate concern, the longer term problem is Greece's competitiveness and the 
effect this has on economic growth and hence tax revenues. In order to survive within 
the euro system, the country needs to modernise and become more productive and 
efficient. Additionally, though Greece has already done much to improve its fiscal 
stance, it still needs to go further and generate permanent primary surpluses. The 
current rescue package requires surpluses of the order of 3.5 percent of GDP for the 
medium term. Alleviation of the debt burden (either outright write-downs or 
extensions of maturity and reduction in interest rates) would, of course, make the task 
of debt management easier. The alternative is for Greece to leave the euro area and 
probably default on its debt. It would still need to carry out the same fiscal reforms, 
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and it would bring other short-term costs, but there would be considerable long-term 
benefits. These are tough choices but they are the only way that Greece can re-take 
control of its economy. In other words, the author concludes by making the economic 
case for Grexit. A prospect that does not command much support in the country, as 
argued above, as surrounding the economic arguments will be social and political 
ramifications that may dwarf any economic benefits.  
In Chapter 8 (On the role of the credit rating agencies in the Euro zone crisis), Periklis 
Boumparis, Costas Milas and Theodore Panagiotidis examine the determinants of 
credit ratings for 18 Eurozone countries over the period 2002-2013. Sovereign credit 
ratings are decomposed into high and low ratings, the high rated being AA- and 
above, and the low rated being A+ and below. The authors consider a set of 
macroeconomic and risk variables as their determinants. First, they find greater 
explanatory power for the former sample (high rated). Second, the results reveal an 
asymmetric response of cumulated current accounts for high and low ratings. Third, 
the Chapter provides evidence that the fiscal and the external sector are significant 
after 2009 only for the low rated economies. Focusing on Greece, evidence is shown 
that the government debt and cumulative current account played a significant role in 
the downgrade of Greek bonds. 
 
Chapter 9 (The Greek Great Depression: A General Equilibrium study of its Drivers) 
by George Economides, Apostolis Philippopoulos and Dimitris Papageorgiou 
provides a quantitative study of the main determinants of the Greek great depression 
since 2010. The authors use a medium-scale DSGE model calibrated to the Greek 
economy between 2000 and 2009 (the euphoria years that followed the adoption of 
the euro). Then, departing from 2010, simulations show that the fiscal policy mix 
adopted, jointly with the deterioration in institutional quality and, specifically, in the 
degree of protection of property rights, can explain essentially all the total loss in 
GDP between 2010 and 2015 (around 26%). In particular, the fiscal policy mix 
accounts for 14% of the total output loss, while the deterioration in property rights 
accounts for another 8%. It thus naturally follows that a less distorting fiscal policy 
mix and a stronger protection of property rights are necessary conditions for Greece’s 
economic recovery.       
Austerity and ‘fiscal consolidation’ is motivated by the need to put public finances in 
order but, because it causes a recession and a reduction in GDP, its effectiveness on 
the debt-GDP ratio may prove a double-edged sword. Though this is widely 
suspected, indeed supported by literature (House, Proebsting and Tesar, 2017; De 
Grauwe and Ji, 2013), it has not yet been crystallised in basic theory. Chapter 10 (The 
limits of austerity: The fiscal multiplier and the ‘debt Laffer curve’) by Christopher 
Tsoukis embeds this idea into a simple formal framework of public finances and 
discusses austerity, conditionality and structural reforms more widely. It asks whether 
there is any maximum public debt-GDP ratio that is serviceable when one allows for 
the fiscal effects of the required primary surpluses (the ‘fiscal multiplier’). This 
simple but novel approach yields a debt Laffer Curve that defines the debt and deficit 
(as ratios over GDP) that may be feasibly sustained. Next, the Chapter reviews 
estimates of the fiscal multiplier and argues on this basis that the maximum 
sustainable debt-GDP is likely less than 100% and the maximum feasible primary 
surplus is less than the 3.5% required by Greece’s creditors for the medium term; this 
analysis shows that insistence on such targets will be self-defeating. Finally, the 
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Chapter critically reviews structural reforms, a key pillar of the conditionality 
imposed on Greece. The policy corollary is that the paramount objective for both 
Greece and its creditors should be the return to high rates of growth, and currently this 
requires relaxation of austerity above all.   
 
The underground economy is quite prominent in Greece (though by its nature, the 
topic does not allow confident, concrete estimates) and this complicates the estimation 
of the effects of fiscal policy as well as the efforts for fiscal rationalisation. This issue 
motivates the next Chapter 11 (Fiscal Consolidation Policies and the Underground 
Economy: The Case of Greece): Evi Pappa, Rana Sajedi and Eugenia Vella examine 
the effects of fiscal consolidation policies using a New Keynesian model with an 
underground sector, calibrated for the Greek economy. They find that spending cuts 
induce a reallocation of production towards the formal sector, thus reducing tax 
evasion. On the other hand, tax hikes increase the incentives to produce in the less 
productive underground sector, implying higher output and unemployment costs. The 
model is used to assess the recent fiscal consolidation plans in Greece. The results 
provide evidence of an increase in underground activity during these consolidations. 
They also reveal significant output and welfare costs, which are exacerbated by the 
presence of the underground economy. 
 
High and prolonged unemployment is one of the main social costs of the Greek crisis; 
this is the theme of the next Chapter (12), titled ‘Output and Unemployment: 
Estimating Okun’s Law for Greece’, in which co-editors Ioannis Bournakis and 
Dimitris Christopoulos estimate Okun’s Law for Greece over the period 1960-2015. 
Their analysis indicates that the growth-unemployment nexus in Greece is subject to 
non-linearities with the existence of lower and higher growth rate regimes. The 
critical growth rate threshold is found to be at the 1%. Accordingly, the elasticity of 
unemployment is estimated to be 1.47% when the economy grows at a rate above 1% 
while unemployment falls by 1.21% when the economy expands at a rate below 1%. 
These estimates indicate a rather gloomy prospect for the reduction of unemployment 
in Greece’s present economic climate. To restore employment to the pre-crisis level, a 
period of 11 years is required if the growth rate is at the upper regime - above 1% - 
while this time horizon increases to 13.4 years if the economy is at the lower regime - 
below 1%. 
 
The topic of Chapter 13, titled: ‘On the Determinants of Non-Performing Loans 
(NPLs): Lessons from Greece’ by Elias Tzavalis, Evangelos Charalambakis and 
Yannis Dendramis, is NPLs, which are rising meteorically, with serious implications 
for the financial viability of commercial banks (which have been repeatedly 
capitalised for this very reason) and for the effects of austerity (the fiscal multiplier, 
which is larger downwards, as argued). In particular, the Chapter investigates the 
relationship between NPLs and their fundamentals, mainly bank and macroeconomic 
variables. This is done based on aggregate portfolio loans in the Greek economy. It is 
argued that Greece constitutes an interesting case for studying the factors determining 
NPLs, given the pervasive recessionary conditions that have characterised it, since the 
outbreak of the crisis in 2010. The Chapter proposes a new econometric framework 
which extends the SUR (seemingly unrelated regressions) framework to allow for a 
common break in its slope coefficient of unknown date. The results reveal that the 
deterioration in the macroeconomic conditions (captured by very high rates of 
unemployment) and political uncertainty constitute key factors of explaining the sharp 
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rise of NPLs of the Greek banking sector after the first quarter of year 2012. With the 
exception of bank profitability, bank-specific variables associated with bank 
capitalisation and liquidity risk seem to determine NPLs only under normal economic 
conditions. 
 
Chapter 14 (Who exports high-quality manufacturing products? some empirical 
regularities from Greek exporting firms) by Sarantis Kalyvitis assesses the quality of 
Greek manufacturing exports and links the estimates to the labour structure of 
exporting firms. Export quality is estimated to have fallen by 1% per year on average 
in the period 1998-2010, but recovered in 2011 and 2012 when export quality 
displayed a cumulative rise of 25.7%, yielding a cumulative rise of 9.2% over the 
entire period 1998-2012. Linking the quality estimates at the product level with 
exporting firms shows that higher product quality is associated with exporters that 
have a higher share of their wage bill paid to skilled workers. This positive 
relationship stems from firms with higher skilled to unskilled employment ratios, 
rather than higher wage skill premia, and is more pronounced in large and rich 
destinations. 
 
Chapter 15 (Spatial structure and spatial dynamics of regional incomes in Greece) by 
Burhan Can Karahasan and Vassilis Monastiriotis explores the theme of spatial 
asymmetries in Greece, a country where about half of population and more than half 
of GDP is concentrated around Athens, and much of the land mass is mountainous 
and uninhabited, while there is a whole host of disconnected islands. The Chapter 
offers a detailed analysis of spatial asymmetries and dynamics in Greece over the long 
period. The analysis finds a general picture of weak spatial associations (‘spatial 
randomness’), underpinned by a number of disconcerting patterns: a trend of 
increasingly localised spatial disparities; a single-cluster formation (‘hotspot’) around 
Athens and the south Aegean islands; a significant role of space (‘neighbourliness’) 
for determining regional convergence and divergence; and, most importantly, the 
emergence of two antithetical trends in spatial association during the period of 
financialisation in the country (intensifying associations in the Athens cluster and 
increasing spatial randomness outside this). We claim that understanding these 
patterns and trends is paramount for designing appropriate policies for sustainable and 
spatially-equitable growth in the country in its post-crisis environment. 
 
The volume concludes with Chapter 16 by co-editors Ioannis Bournakis and 
Christopher Tsoukis, titled: ‘Greece’s competitiveness: A survey and concluding 
remarks’. The chapter identifies the specialisation pattern of the Greek economy in 
the years prior to the crisis and analyses the various conceptual dimensions of 
competitiveness. Although Greece has experienced an increase in Unit Labour Costs 
(ULC), this could not be regarded as the only, not perhaps even the key, factor behind 
the accumulated current account imbalances. Greece has been gradually de-
industrialising since 1980s and this process accelerated in the years after country’s 
accession to the common currency. The post-euro era was essentially a period of 
massive capital inflows, which transformed Greece into a highly introvert economy. 
Improving competitiveness in Greece requires a different production and export 
paradigm, which is not embedded into the recipe of internal devaluation imposed to 
Greece in exchange of external bailout programmes. In an increasingly globalised 
environment being competitive is a far more complex process than simply reducing 
the cost of labour as manifested in the Competitiveness Pact (2011). It is now up to 
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Greece’s’ political and economic elite to design and implement an economic 
regeneration plan, an extremely challenging task given the chronic inadequacy of the 
political system.   
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